Reza Mosmer
Abstract
In the Tractatus (remarks §3.02-3.031) Wittgenstein argues that an illogical world is inconceivable and it is impossible to talk about it. Ryle (1946), in contrast, thinks that one’s puzzlement with inconceivability of an illogical world and impossibility of talking about it, is resolvable. ...
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In the Tractatus (remarks §3.02-3.031) Wittgenstein argues that an illogical world is inconceivable and it is impossible to talk about it. Ryle (1946), in contrast, thinks that one’s puzzlement with inconceivability of an illogical world and impossibility of talking about it, is resolvable. He believes that the puzzle is not real and the debate about meaningfulness of sentences about illogical world is provoked by categorical mistake. Ryle argues that the term “(il)logical” can only be applied to subjects who are capable of observing and breaching logical rules. The world and its facts, accordingly, cannot follow or breach the rules of logic. This means that the whole worry about predication of the concept “(il)logical” on the world, is groundless and absurd. The term “(il)logical” cannot be applied to the world and predication of it on the world is, indeed, an instance of committing category mistake. In this paper, after explaining Wittgenstein and Ryle’s positions in this debate, I shall try to show that Ryle’s argument against Wittgenstein is not sound. To this end, I appeal to Gilbert Harman’s distinction between logic and rationality, and implication and inference, respectively. I argue that Ryle has failed to observe this vital distinction.
